importance of immigrants to the United States, all agree the immigration system itself is broken because it takes too long to immigrate legally (if that option exists for the individual), while the numbers of illegal immigrants continues to rise. Before policy makers can determine how to remodel immigration policy and the immigration system to serve America's ongoing familial, social, and economic needs, two major symptoms of the current system must be addressed: the backlog of immigrant visa applications and illegal immigration.
A BROKEN IMMIGRATION SYSTEM: TWO VITAL REMEDIES BEFORE POLICY REFORM
As President Ronald Reagan noted in 1981, the United States is a nation of immigrants; indeed, with the exception of Native Americans, every family in the United States has its historical roots somewhere else. 1 Immigrants have built the country, defended its borders, and expanded the economy; restrictionists say they have also diluted the culture, burdened society, and drained government resources. 2 The Independent Task Force on Immigration (the Task Force) at the Council on Foreign
Relations believes immigration "is an important part of [America's] core values as a nation." 3 Regardless of individual perspectives on the impact and importance of immigrants to the United States, there is "a widespread and accurate perception that the immigration system is not working nearly as well as it should be, either for Americans or for many of the immigrants." 4 Immigration has long been a multi-layered, complicated policy issue that is influenced by a myriad of factors, not the least of which are state and local politics, individual histories, biases, and experiences, and competing priorities and equities.
One can certainly assume that any attempt at reform will be equally complicated because of these factors and more. Scholars Jeffrey Passel and Michael Fix contend that U.S. immigration policy is thought to be "driven [solely] by economic goals," when instead it is based on a complex, multi-faceted set of goals that also cover moral, social, and cultural reasons for immigration. "U.S. immigration policy needs to be viewed as not one, but three fundamentally different sets of rules … governing legal immigration … humanitarian admissions … and those that control illegal entry." 5 Each of these three immigration sub-components has its own history that is reflected in the laws, policies, and practices that govern it; each also affects the other due to the interwoven nature of immigration-related issues.
Many immigration scholars focus their writing primarily on the problem of illegal immigrants and the related concerns of sovereignty, enforcement, and border security.
Another camp focuses almost exclusively on the need to support the U.S. economy by increasing the number of specialized worker visas allocated to nonimmigrants. As a result, the immigration decision-makers often narrow their attention on ways to increase employment-based short-term visa allocations, or look to address the steady stream of illegal migrants through tightened screening procedures and border security, enhanced employer disincentives for hiring illegal aliens, and increased deportations. All of these aspects of immigration are important in the larger policy debate, and they will influence the future of any reform decisions. Likewise, there should be thoughtful consideration in the immigration debate as to whom should be allowed to immigrate, including development of a way to determine the "right" mix of family members, workers, and humanitarian admissions (refugees, asylees, and special immigrants) authorized to emigrate to the United States.
This paper contends, however, that discussion of these issues is important, but akin to putting the cart ahead of the horse. There will never be lasting, useful reform of the immigration system unless lawmakers resolve the two most pressing concerns of the existing legal immigration system. Specifically, solutions must be developed to address the huge backlog of immigrant visa cases and the unprecedented number of illegal immigrants already resident in the United States. Both are the operational fallout of a flawed system. The manner in which these two issues are handled now will (and should) inform any future debate on immigration reform because their remedies have strategic implications for future policy development. Politically salable, workable plans to mitigate these two critical issues will require short-term changes to policy that may create the political space necessary to develop comprehensive reform options that in turn result in a "working immigration system that alleviates long and counterproductive backlogs and delays, and ensures that whatever laws are enacted by Congress are enforced thoroughly and effectively."
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This paper seeks to address these two fundamental issues, while setting aside discussion of immigration as a national security and foreign policy tool or a subject related to humanitarian admissions, law enforcement, and border security, which are all far-reaching topics worthy of separate in-depth analysis. By looking at current immigration statistics through the lens of the immigration process, including the primary categories of immigrants and the means by which they enter the United States, it will become clear how immigration reform in 1965 caused shortcomings that continue to limit the effectiveness of the current policy. A brief assessment of the benefits and costs of immigrants to the United States will serve to frame the importance of immigration to the U.S. economy, which will always be a critical component of any meaningful discussion of immigration policy. A review of past immigration reform proposal failures highlights how attempts to provide workarounds for small, more manageable issues have done little to remedy in any real way the fundamental problems that exist. Lastly, proposals for resolving the two biggest problems may alleviate the pressure on the current system, provide a political proving ground for possible long-term policy changes to the system, and serve as guideposts to a new strategic framework for immigration reform. American citizens (regardless of their country of origin), while it almost doubled the annual immigration limit in numerically controlled categories to 290,000. As a result, "family integration … became the centerpiece of national policy." 15 In the human rightscentered 1960s, the legislation was seen as an "extension of the civil rights movement," 16 and it passed with overwhelming support, in part because the revisions were seen as "humanitarian." 17 Opponents of the restructuring, however, were concerned that the changes would alter the fabric of American culture through a rapid rise in immigration numbers overall and a shift in the source countries from whence immigrants would arrive. 18 They worried that such a dramatic shift in the national immigration strategy would have a long-term impact on immigration, a notion that Senator Edward Kennedy (D-MA) refuted in early 1965.
First, our cities will not be flooded with a million immigrants annually. Under the proposed bill, the present level of immigration remains substantially the same. … Secondly, the ethnic mix of this country will not be upset. … In the final analysis, the ethnic pattern of immigration under the proposed measure is not expected to change as sharply as the critics seem to think. Pia Orrenius and Madeline Zavodny believe the current immigration policy is inflexibly skewed toward family reunification, when instead the policy should be more dynamic and allow the U.S. government to flex over time how it prioritizes family-and employment-based immigration. 32 The Task Force agrees, stating in its report that the lengthy delays in allowing immigration from some countries are "so long that the applicant may well have finished most of his or her working life before arriving in the United States," which does nothing to serve American economic needs, while it also makes "a mockery of the concept of family reunification." 33 The Visa Services Bulletin put out in February 2012 to assist U.S. consular sections with scheduling March 2012 appointments lends credence to these assertions. According to this Bulletin, the shortest wait time for family preference (based on the priority date of the petition) is for children of LPRs; appointments can be scheduled for applicants whose petitions were originally filed earlier than July 1, 2009, which means they have waited almost three years just for the visa appointment. 34 Unmarried sons/daughters of American citizens must currently wait seven years for their appointments, unless they hail from Mexico, which extends that wait by 11 years. 35 The longest delay, however, is for the siblings of American citizens, who must wait anywhere between 11.5 and 23.5 years for their cases to become eligible for scheduling. 36 Although many categories of employmentbased immigrant visa cases can be processed immediately, applicants in the lowerskilled workers categories must wait between six and 10 years for their cases to be scheduled because of per-country limits. Without doubt, it is hard to believe that a wait time of one or two generations could be considered meaningful family reunification or of benefit to the U.S. economy.
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Yet despite long wait times, statistics show that demand to move to the United
States with an immigrant visa is at an all-time high. For the fiscal year ending September 30, 2010, 482,052 individuals were issued immigrant visas to allow them to move permanently to the United States; somewhat surprisingly, fewer than three percent of these were issued as the result of an employment-based petition. 38 In the same year, more than one million people became legal permanent residents of the programs to check the eligibility of non-citizens for their programs, which decreased the number of illegal aliens on the welfare rolls, but resulted in a rise in the use and availability of false identity documents. 54 These employer sanctions were expected to counter the "pull" for illegal immigrants of the U.S. economy. 55 The Act increased funding for border security and created an office within the Justice Department to oversee new anti-discrimination safeguards designed to protect workers on the basis of national origin. In addition to expanding the H-2A agricultural foreign workers program, IRCA provided a legalization track for permanent residency for up to 350,000
undocumented workers who could prove they had lived in the United States for the preceding three years and during those years had worked at least 90 days each in the agriculture industry. The Act also allowed certain Cuban and Haitian refugees to become LPRs and provided a legalization track for any resident who could not be excluded for other reasons and who had been residing continuously in the United States since before January 1, 1982. 56 The goal of these "amnesty" programs was to regularize the status of more than three million undocumented workers in the United
States at the time in order to "wipe the slate clean." 57 Unfortunately, the positive impact was short-lived. According to the SBA, immigrant-founded businesses generated $67 billion, or 11.6 percent, of all U.S. business income using Census 2000 data. increases the productivity of both and raises the standard of living for American workers by lowering prices, especially for "immigrant-intensive" services such as gardening, child care, and cleaning services. 73 Statistics from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) also show that foreign-born men in the United States, regardless of their legal status, are across the board more likely to be employed than Americans who are in the same age brackets, even though the foreign-born men find it more difficult to find work initially. 74 The CBO asserts that "most efforts" to determine the net effect of immigration on tax revenues indicate that immigrants have a positive effect at the federal level by contributing more in taxes than they use in federal services; the office also notes that their impact at the local and state government taxes is mixed. 75 Detractors, however, believe that immigrants (legal and not) only drain scarce resources. John Isibister argues that the question is complicated, because illegal immigrants "impose less of a fiscal burden than legal immigrants of the same nationality," while legal immigrants are more likely to take advantage of the social benefits available to them. He also argues that the national origin of the immigrant is a determining factor in the associated financial burden of the immigrant, since "different ethnic groups have different rates of participation in the welfare system." 76 At the state and local levels, unauthorized immigrants tend to participate in social benefit programs at higher rates than legal immigrants do, while their wages are generally lower and they have less disposable income to spend on items subject to sales tax. Illegal immigrants are less likely to have health insurance, which can place a burden on hospital emergency rooms partly financed by federal funds and mandated to provide services regardless of the legal status of the user, 77 but these migrants are also least likely to take advantage of some local services for fear of their illegal status being discovered and being deported. immigrants pay Social Security taxes -even though they cannot benefit in the future from their contributions. 79 The Social Security Advisory Board has indicated that this financial inflow to the SSA vault is and will remain vital to a system that is increasingly burdened by an aging American population that is increasing its draw of SSA benefits. 80 The Task Force summarizes concerns about the economic important of immigration succinctly:
More than half the recent growth in the U.S. labor force has come from immigration, and nearly all future growth will come from immigrants or from current workers delaying retirement. … If the U.S. loses its economic edge, its power will diminish. Getting immigration policy right is therefore critical to U.S. economic and political leadership [in the world].
Piecemeal Patches Don't Work
While it is clear that the immigration system is broken, the ideal manner in which to fix it is less clear. Family reunification may be at the heart of current immigration policy, but the numerical limits imposed on immigrant numbers delay reunification for years, if not decades. Lengthy delays for workers to enter the United States legally minimizes their ability to contribute to America's economy and has the follow-on effect of encouraging others to bypass the system altogether, resulting in a steady stream of illegal migrants. American schools, colleges, and universities educate more than 700,000 international students each year, yet most of them must return home because they have no means of staying in the United States to put their new knowledge to work for American companies. Legislation designed to address some of these issues have only served to further complicate the system, which is now overwhelmingly complex due IRCA also created a new employment preference category of 10,000 immigrant visas each year for individuals who could invest between $500,000 and $1 million in a new commercial enterprise that would employ at least 10 full-time legally resident workers (not including the investor's spouse or children). 83 This might have been a great idea, but implementation is affected by the existing system, resulting in more than 1,800 individuals waiting in the queue for appointments in this investor immigrant category. Immigration Task Force. 87 Some within the group argued that certain family member categories should be "phased out" as potential immigrants, while others felt that "extended family networks" remain an important part of the U.S. social fabric and a component of U.S. immigration policy. There is no doubt that family member sponsorship will remain a politically charged issue, and that imposing restrictions on the "right" of Americans and LPRs to petition for family members should be a key question for lawmakers to consider when they attempt to reform the immigration system. Absent a change to this cornerstone of immigration policy, the United States will only continue to see increased chain immigration and related long-term backlogs as the ever-growing U.S. population continues to file greater numbers of petitions for family members to emigrate to the United States.
Orrenius and Zavodny argue that only those people who are immediate relatives (spouses/children) of Americans and LPRs should be allowed to remain in the queue.
For all other intending immigrants, they feel the U.S. government should simply remove them from the backlog by cancelling their cases and refunding all related fees to the petitioner. 88 Even if this idea could make it past the political fallout that would ensue, it is problematic financially. 89 It seems more reasonable to address this backlog by processing the current cases to conclusion more quickly by increasing the number of available visas while concurrently implementing some sort of moratorium on new petitions filed by these new immigrants.
An important factor to consider in processing the backlog cases more quickly is the need to increase inflows without overwhelming overseas consular offices, which are already working at full capacity. One way to accomplish this would be to allow certain immigrant visa applicants to apply for nonimmigrant visas instead and allow them to adjust status once in the United States, in effect making them quasi-immigrant visas;
this process is already in place for fiancés and certain spouses/children of Americans and LPRs . 90 This side-door option could speed the immigration of individuals in targeted categories (because nonimmigrant visas have no numerical limitations), while minimizing the impact on overseas posts and still requiring those individuals to undergo the same security and medical checks that currently exist for all immigrant cases.
For example, the terms of INA 201 limit the total number of employment-based immigrant visas to 144,000 (for 2012), with no more than 10,080 coming from any one country. Due to the per-country cap and a complex prioritizing system within the employment-based sub-categories, the actual number of visas issued is always significantly less than the aggregate number authorized. Using data from the existing backlog, the total number of waiting employment-based visa cases combine to less than one full year's allowable entries (currently 123,333 applicants). By lifting the per-country cap, all employment-based visa cases could be processed in one year, an option that would be speed entry for qualified applicants in this category. 91 This group is also an ideal target for fast-tracking, since all but 2,616 of the applicants are in sub-categories that require Department of Labor pre-certification by the petitioning employer that he has been unable to find workers in the United States to do the jobs -pre-vetting that should counter any concern about adding unemployed workers to the U.S. economy.
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Barring the use of a nonimmigrant visa as a de facto immigrant visa for cases to be fast-tracked, the only other way to increase inflow is to increase dramatically the overall numbers of immigrant visas available each year and adjust the per-country cap.
If all employment-based cases were fast-tracked, the family preference categories could be parsed in a way that is reasonable and reflective of existing queues by country. The backlog could be reduced by 25 percent over three years if the total number of family preference-based cases was doubled to 452,000 and the per-country cap was lifted;
unfortunately, this would still leave 3.145 million visa applicants still waiting in the queue. 93 Other options that might reduce this number further include:
1. Suspending for several years the DV program to allow those annual 55,000 allocated visas to be used for other pending cases or new options as noted below;
2. Expediting all cases involving unmarried sons/daughters under age 30 so that they might enter and contribute to the economy as workers more quickly; that employs a certain number of non-family members, has purchased a home worth more than the median price in his geographic region (using cash or with a mortgage that does not require private mortgage insurance), or through demonstration of savings/investments at a certain level sustained over time. Most importantly, however, to avoid the chain immigration phenomena, these immigrants would be penalized for breaking U.S. immigration law in the long-term through a delay in their ability to naturalize as U.S. citizens and through restrictions on their privilege of petitioning for family members until they become citizens.
Conclusion
An immigration policy put into place more than 45 years ago continues to underpin the present-day system in such a way that is has become ineffective at meeting the needs of a 21 st century America. Before policymakers can address changes to immigration policy and practice through reform of any type, it is vital that the two primary failures of the existing system be addressed so that the resolutions themselves can aid in moving the reform debate forward. As long as millions of individuals are waiting to emigrate to the United States, it will remain impossible for politicians to gain the public support they need to propose changes to policy, especially any that may restructure who can petition and reprioritize who can enter and when.
Absent this backlog, or with prospects for it being reduced in the near future, it is more likely that significant shifts in existing policy can be discussed and that the political will to effect those changes might exist. Putting into place a process to reduce substantially, and relatively quickly, the huge queue of existing legal immigration cases, while limiting follow-on petitioning rights will allow politicians to test the public's resiliency regarding restrictions to future family preference categories and limits on petitioning abilities. Public responses to these limitations may then assist policy makers in determining how to balance economic, humanitarian, and family reunification admissions in future immigration policies in ways that are practical, fair, balanced, and adjustable over time.
Earned legalization for those illegally present in the United States is the right policy choice, but one that must be made with care and attention to the politics and implications of normalization of status. The United States cannot afford to legalize 11 million individuals without also ensuring they do not create a greater backlog of future family immigrants. Individuals must earn the right to stay here permanently through the payment of fines and proof of societal involvement via work histories, payment of taxes, and learning English. Those who can demonstrate financial support to the economy through job creation, investment, and home ownership should be afforded a fast track to permanent legal status. All, however, must realize that there will remain residual effects of their lack of respect for the rule of law through a series of steps to gain permanent legal status and citizenship, along with lifetime restrictions on their ability to petition the government for other family members to enter the United States.
Revising U.S. immigration policy and practice to fit 21 st century needs will, without doubt, be fraught with difficulty because there are conflicting priorities and interests that make almost all elements of the problem contentious. Politicians are going to need to make hard choices and work together, as they did in the 1960s and 1980s, to build an immigration system that works for America long-term. It is vital, however, that lawmakers start to work immediately on remedies that will enable them to move the debate forward in a meaningful way. "If the United States continues to mishandle its immigration policy, it will damage one of the vital underpinnings of 34 The priority date is the official term for the date the petition was accepted by USCIS. When an applicant appears for an interview, he must prove he is qualified for the visa and has no ineligibilities. There is never any guarantee of visa issuance at an appointment, and if the applicant's case is incomplete for whatever reason (including the need for additional administrative processing by the Department of State), the delay until issuance of the visa can at times be quite protracted. 35 In this category, petitions by American citizens for their unmarried sons/daughters who hold Mexican nationality are current for scheduling if they were filed before May 1, 1993 37 E-3/EW workers require a permanent, full-time job offer to work in one of three categories in a position for which the Department of Labor has certified qualified workers are not available in the United States. The three categories are skilled (those whose job is not seasonal or temporary and which requires a minimum of two years training or work experience, not of a temporary or seasonal nature), professional (someone whose job requires at least a U.S. baccalaureate degree or a foreign equivalent), or unskilled, non-seasonal labor, which requires less than two years training or experience. Indian workers in these categories must have priority dates prior to August 22, 2002 There is always a difference between the number of issued immigrant visas and the number of entrants because most immigrants' visas are valid for initial entry up to six months from the date of issuance. 41 Because of high demand and long wait times, many go around the immigrant visa system and move to the U.S. permanently (and legally) through marriage to an American citizen, a highly popular option that can be confirmed by the hundreds of thousands of results in an online "marry a U.S. citizen" Google search. Fiancé nonimmigrant visas are available for those who live outside the U.S. but intend to marry within 60 days of arrival in the U.S.; they then adjust status with USCIS. Those already in the U.S. can marry an American and apply for adjustment of status immediately, regardless of how they entered the U.S. A small number of individuals can self-petition as investors and extraordinary individuals. 42 This figure reflects the individuals who were found eligible for visas out of the total 8,319,235 who applied; this figure does not include individuals who traveled to the U.S. visa-free under the Visa Waiver Program. U.S. Department of State, NIV Workload by Visa Category FY 2010, http://www.travel.state.gov/pdf/FY2010NIVWorkloadbyVisaCategory.pdf (accessed on January 31, 2012). 43 "Temporary" can be a misleading term when discussing visas. Almost all of the 81 different categories in which nonimmigrant visas may be issued allow individuals to live, study and/or work in the U.S. for as much as five years (renewable); individuals with these visas may also be able to adjust status to become legal permanent residents, although not everyone with the option to do so will choose to become an LPR. Travelers who enter visa-free under the Visa Waiver Program are not allowed to adjust status. 46 Mexicans have worked in agricultural jobs in the United States since the early 1900s. During World War II, much in the same way that American women backstopped men in the industrial economy, Mexican labor kept the agricultural economy afloat, most notably under a treaty with Mexico that created the controversial Bracero program. Under the treaty, which was in place from 1942 to 1964, the U.S. government recruited workers in poor, isolated Mexican provinces on behalf of American private employers. The program was overseen by the Farm Security Administration (FSA), which was to manage the inflow of workers through both quantitative and qualitative control of work contracts, wages, and living and work conditions. Unfortunately, because FSA was woefully understaffed, it was never able to guarantee the minimum conditions set forth in the treaty, which allowed employers to take advantage of workers, gave rise to an increase in black market recruiting and smuggling of workers, and gave employers the incentive to bypass the bond, contracting fee, and other safeguards designed to protect Bracero program participants. Hing, Defining America, 126-133. 47 
